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Abstract 
Using privately-owned-enterprises (POEs) data in China, we find that access to external finance 
is a statistically significant factor explaining their probability of undertaking foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The significance of external finance is magnified in industries featured by high 
external finance dependence, high technology, low tangibility, and high inventory. The external 
finance and FDI linkage is weaker for POEs with group affiliation, but stronger for those 
employing generous employment welfare practices.  
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External Finance and the Decision of Foreign Direct Investment:  
Evidence from Privately-Owned-Enterprises in China 
 
 
1. INTRODUCITON 
 
Although foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a salient aspect of economic globalization, 
undertaking FDI abroad remains a privilege of few firms. For example, Ottavaiano and Mayer 
(2007) report that across Europe, around 5% firms undertake FDI. This figure only improves 
marginally in Germany: one of the most developed economies in Europe. 5.5% of German firms 
are reported to have FDI activities (Buch, Kesternich, Lipponer, and Schnitzer 2009). It is 
plausible to assume that even fewer firms from emerging and transition markets are able to 
expand into foreign market in the form of FDI. In the view that outward FDI is a symbol of and a 
tool to fortify national competitiveness (Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010), and it also enables firms to 
diversify their assets and sustain risk-adjusted growth (Goldstein and Razin, 2006), it is 
imperative to understand firm level factors of internationalization.  
 
Traditional industrial organizational view of FDI is primarily based on product or technology 
market imperfections but assumes frictionless financial markets (see a summary from Markusen, 
2002). According to this view, changes in FDI flows are due to product market imperfections 
and incompleteness of contracts for intermediate goods. The purpose of current paper is to show 
that this view is incomplete at best. We concentrate on the micro foundations of external finance 
while abstract from questions of the existence of structural distortions or competitive effects of 
multinationals. We view that the decision of FDI at firm level involves a substantial fixed cost, 
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therefore firms’ access to external finance has a significant impact on their ability to undertake 
FDI. Empirically, we focus on Chinese privately-owned-enterprises’ (POEs’) greenfield FDI 
data to test our hypotheses for several reasons. First, majority of outward FDI from China only 
commenced in early 2000s with the state campaign of encouraging outward FDI (Buckley et al., 
2007). Our data starts from 1999 which well captures most firms’ first time FDI decision. This 
enables us to more accurately examine the impact of external finance on firms’ FDI decision. 
Second, the idiosyncratic institutional environment in China makes POEs not only more 
financially constrained than their state- and foreign-owned peers, but also among the most 
financially constrained in developing countries (Claessens and Tzioumis, 2006)1. But private 
sector contributes to over 50% of the country’s GDP, and is increasingly more active in global 
markets. Third, we focus on greenfield FDI because fixed costs are the most relevant parameter 
for greenfield FDI decision as opposed to cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Davies and 
Kristjansdottir, 2010).   
 
We have four important findings. We find that external finance is a statistically significant 
predictor of the probability of FDI decision for Chinese POEs. Its significance is magnified in 
industries that are featured by high external finance dependence, high technology, low 
tangibility, and high inventory. POEs with group association rely less on access to external 
finance than those without group association. By contrast, POEs employing more generous 
welfare provision are more vulnerable to credit market than their peers with poor labor welfare 
provision. This paper is among the first to examine the causal relationship between firms’ access 
to external finance in their home market and their FDI decision. Our findings suggest that the 
home institutional environment shapes firms’ opportunities to undertake FDI. We also contribute 
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to a deeper understanding of how firm strategies may vary their reliance on access to finance, 
which have both managerial and policy implications. We will discuss this in greater detail in 
conclusion.  
 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. We outline earlier theoretical literature of 
FDI, and then explain how access to external finance can fill in the gap of previous theoretical 
discussions, which leads to hypothesis development.  We explain our data and methodology in 
Section three. Our empirical results are reported and discussed in Section four. We conclude the 
paper in Section five.  
 
 
2 LITETATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
In a world of perfect competition for goods and production factors, FDI cannot exist 
(Kindleberger, 1969: 13). Consequently, the theoretical development of FDI has since centered 
on various “market imperfections”, which, in simple terms, are defined as impediments to the 
simple interaction of supply and demand to set a market price (Rugman, 1981).  For example, 
Hymer (1976) proposes industrial structural distortion as a source of market power. Firms in 
oligopolistic industries enjoy the advantages of economies of scale and other characteristics that 
give them market power, which enable them to overcome the disadvantages of being foreign and 
compete with local rivals in the host country. Another influential theory, by contrast, emphasizes 
the role of transaction costs in explaining FDI (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1991). In 
this approach, it is argued that FDI arises as a response of failure in intermediate markets, such 
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as the market for intangible assets, which involves bringing under common ownership and 
control the activities linked by the market.  
 
Recent theoretical development turns attention to the role of firms’ productivity, suggesting that 
firms self-select into internationalization based on their productivity. Built on the seminal model 
of Melitz (2003), it is argued that the fixed cost barrier of export means that only more 
productive firms can overcome the barrier and less productive ones remain their business in their 
home market. But productivity is only one means by which firms may mitigate the constraints of 
high fixed costs; even most productive firms have to deploy external finance to support their 
export activities. This has been considered in recent research which embeds credit constraints 
into the heterogeneous firm model of trade of Melitz (2003). There are two premises of these 
models (Manova, Wei and Zhang, 2011; Manova, 2013). The first is that firms must sustain 
sizable fixed costs for entering a foreign market and that these costs must be paid up front. 
Hence, firms which wish to export must have enough liquidity at hand. The second premise is 
that firms cannot fully pledge the returns of foreign sales to investors. For example, information 
on foreign markets is not only hard to obtain for firms but also difficult to verify for creditors. 
Therefore, a creditor such as a bank could be unwilling to put its own money at risk. The fixed 
cost based view and the implications of external finance have been empirically examined in 
firm’s export decision (Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Greenaway, Guariglia and Kneller, 2007; 
Muuls, 2008; Berman and Hericourt, 2010; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Manova, Wei and Zhang, 
2011).  
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However, few studies have investigated the relationship between external finance and firms’ FDI 
decisions. But it warrants a systematic investigation because fixed cost requirement is higher for 
FDI than for export since it involves a setup of new facilities abroad instead of additional 
production based at home for export markets. It also takes a longer lead time for FDI project to 
recoup initial cost and reach breakeven. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) argues that only 
firms with superior productivity can overcome the fixed cost barrier to undertake FDI. We 
suggest that although higher productivity will certainly give firms a strong position, even most 
productive firms have to rely on external finance to some extent to facilitate their FDI. Empirical 
evidence on the relationship between firms’ access to finance and their FDI decisions remains 
scarce. A notable exception is Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002) which shows an interesting 
linkage between Japanese banks’ credit rating and the FDI decision of firms dependent on these 
banks. The study is in the context of yen’s high appreciation against US dollars in the 1990s. 
Instead of observing more Japanese FDI into the US (e.g. a wealth-enhancing effect due to 
strong home currency), Japanese FDI in the US collapsed from its peak of 30% in 1990 to only 
1% through much of the 1990s due to major banks across Japan experienced a dramatic collapse 
in the financial condition of its banking system in the period. It demonstrates the impaired FDI 
by Japanese firms as a direct consequence of Japanese banks’ deteriorating credit position, which 
cannot be explained by traditional FDI theories.  
 
In our study, we gauge the impact of external finance on the probability of FDI by focusing on 
POEs in China. Developing countries usually have distorted and under-developed financial 
markets. In particular, there are numerous criticisms of China’s banking system including factors 
that inhibit it from providing finance to the private sector. These are reflected in the stylized facts 
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that banks are state controlled (almost 100% controlled by the government during the period of 
our study); carry out policy lending that follows government directives rather than commercial 
considerations; and discriminate against POEs (Brandit and Li, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2003).  As 
support for the latter stylized fact, bank statistics show that although the private sector accounts 
for over 50% of the economy, its accounts for just 7% of bank lending (Firth, Lin, Liu and 
Wong, 2009), making Chinese POEs the most constrained among their peers in developing 
countries. In China, public ownership is regarded as a defining feature of socialism, which 
explains a deep-seated ideological prejudice against private ownership. The 15th Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party in September 1997 lifted many legal and economic barriers to private 
sector growth. In 2004, the National Congress approved a constitutional amendment to protect 
private property rights, granting “private property” an equal legal status to “public property”. 
Despite the constitutional changes and official encouragement of the private sector, the 
government’s ownership of formal external financing sources inevitably leads to a biased capital 
allocation policy that discriminates against private business (Brandt and Li, 2003; Ge and Qiu, 
2007). Therefore, POEs are more likely than others to be constrained by their access to external 
finance for their FDI activities. Thus we hypothesize: 
H1: All else equal, there is a positive linkage between a POE’s access to bank credit and its 
probability of undertaking FDI.  
 
While access to external finance is important in all industries, some sectors depend considerably 
more on the financial system. Finance literature has identified several important determinants of 
sectors’ financial vulnerability that are technologically determined, exogenous from the 
perspective of individual firms, and innate to the manufacturing process in an industry. First, 
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firms in some sectors have substantially greater liquidity needs because they face higher upfront 
sunk and/or fixed costs and thus require more external finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). For 
example, pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on external finance to facilitate high risk and 
costly investment in drug invention. DiMasi, Grabowski, and Vernon (2004) estimated that 
developing a new drug during the 1990s cost about $400 to $500 million on average, and the 
time required from project inception to commercial introduction of a new drug average four to 
ten years. Therefore, industries featured by high R&D investment tend to be more credit 
constrained. Second, industries also differ in their endowment of tangible assets that can be 
pledged as collateral (Brau, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). This explains that firms with 
fewer tangible assets usually face higher credit constrains (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Maksinovic, 2005). In addition, external finance dependency can be heightened for industries 
with more inventories because inventory reflects the duration of the production process and the 
liquidity necessary to maintain inventories and meet market demand (Schiantarelli, 1995). 
Taking the arguments together, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
H2: all else equal, the positive linkage between a POE’s access to bank credit and its probability 
of undertaking FDI is stronger in industries having higher reliance on external finance.  
 
To mitigate financial constraints owing to institutional and industry attributes, there are some 
alternatives that POEs can pursue, one of which is to join group association. A business group is 
a set of firms, which, though legally independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal 
and informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated actions (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001: 
47). They are different from a multidivisional firm because its group affiliates are all 
independent legal entities. They are also different from a network of firms because they have 
9/37 
 
strong central coordination and strategic and financial controls among affiliates in the group 
(Yiu, Lau and Bruton, 2007). In the process of China’s searching for suitable corporate forms 
since 1978, reformers studied Japanese and Korean business groups were impressed by their 
evident capacity to absorb new technologies, deliver stable financial performance, and achieve 
international competitiveness (Nee, 1992; Ma and Lu, 2005). As a result, the state signalled that 
it would favour the reorganization of SOEs into recognized business groups. What followed was 
a rampant business group fever, resulting in a dramatic growth in the number of business groups 
(Hahn and Lee, 2006). In the background of large scale of privatization, SOE managers were 
frequently able to buy-out their enterprises, often at very low prices, and de novo groups founded 
by private entrepreneurs appeared. In this fashion, numerous private business groups began to 
emerge on the fringe of the economy.  
 
Private business groups, much alike their state counterparts, are characterized by a core firm 
known as the group company, which has equity, debt, personnel, and trading links with affiliate 
firms (Carney, Shapiro, and Tang, 2009). They are cross-industry, cross-regional entities with 
strong ties to the state (Keister, 1998; White, Hoskisson, Yiu, and Bruton, 2008). There are also 
strong social connections such as family and school ties among member firms in Chinese 
business groups (Keister, 2000; Luo and Chung, 2005). The institutional economics perspective 
suggests that organizational innovations emerge to fill institutional voids in response to market 
failures in emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Stark, 1996). Similarly, finance 
literature explains that business groups are a “mechanism for dealing with deficiencies in the 
markets for primary factors, risk, and intermediate products in developing countries” (Leff, 
1978: 667). Group association therefore can facilitate POEs to access credits from other 
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members in the group operating in different industries and/or different regions so that group 
networks have the flexibility to shift a given amount of scarce capital between members (Stein, 
1997). Therefore, group association provides members with an internal market to access finance 
at a much lower transaction cost than that in the marketplace. In addition, while the group 
members’ business activities are diversified across sectors and regions, each will have different 
cash flow volatility. This will lower the bankruptcy risk and better access to credit for member 
firms (Lewellen, 1971; Stein, 2003). As a result, private firms with group association will be less 
vulnerable to external credit markets for their FDI activities. We suggest: 
H3: all else equal, the positive linkage between a POE’s access to bank credit and its probability 
of undertaking FDI is weaker for POEs with group association than those without. 
 
Apart from joining group association to mitigate capital market frictions and institutional 
disadvantage, POEs can also adjust their internal labour practices to reduce their reliance on 
external finance for FDI. The interaction between labour practices and firms’ financial position is 
an under-researched area (Berk, Stanton and Zechner, 2010), but previous studies have 
demonstrated that, for example, firms with rigid labour practices tend to have lower profitability 
than their counterparts with flexible labour practices (Hirsh, 1991; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005); 
more rigid labour contracts limit firms’ ability to deploy external finance (Butt-Jaggia and 
Thakor, 1994; MacKay, 2003); and labour intensive firms hold lower levels of debt to reduce 
bankruptcy risk that can be inflicted upon their employees (Berger, Ofek and Yermack, 1997; 
Kayhan, 2003). Therefore, labour practices have a wide range of implications on firms’ finance 
decisions, performance, and investment behaviour.  
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We trace the potential channels through which firms’ labour practices affect their ability and 
need to borrow externally, which in turn influences to what extent they will have adequate 
finance for FDI. Labour costs and associated employment welfare provision are a significant part 
of operation costs. When the employment contract between the employer and employees is rigid, 
labour costs have “quasi fixed” attributes (Oi, 1962), that is, the employer cannot fire his 
employees without significant cost. This will make the firm more conservative in its financial 
decisions, such as borrow less from banks even when bank loans are accessible. But if the 
contractual relations between the employer and its employees are relatively flexible, a firm can 
transform a portion of “quasi fixed” labour costs into variable ones, reducing overall operation 
rigidity. Reduced operation rigidity will generate twofold benefit. First, it will enable firms to 
acquire capacity to variations in the economic environment, downsizing or expanding as supply 
and demand conditions dictate. This will help firms retain higher cash flows and increase 
profitability (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). Second, more flexible labour practices also can reduce 
firms’ bankruptcy risk of deploying external finance, therefore will not deter them from 
borrowing from banks (Butt-Jaggia and Thakor, 1994; MacKay, 2003). Both channels will 
convey finance flexibility to firms, which reduces their vulnerability to credit market 
imperfections. Hence, we suggest the following: 
H4: All else equal, the positive linkage between a firm’s access to bank credit and its probability 
of undertaking FDI is stronger (weaker) for POEs with rigid (flexible) labour practices. 
 
Having presented our hypotheses, we proceed to explain our data and methodology in Section 
three.  
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3 DATA, ECONOMETRICS, AND MEASUREMENT 
 
3.1 Research data 
We use a rich unbalanced longitudinal dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms in Wuxi in 1999 to 
2007 to test our hypotheses2. The city of Wuxi is located in southeast of China, about 80 miles 
from the commercial centre of mainland China – Shanghai. It’s GDP per capita was USD$17,050 
in 2011, making it top one in Jiangsu province, and top five in China. It is also twice the China’s 
national GDP per capita, which was USD$ 8,387 in the same year. Internationally, its per capita 
is comparable to countries such as Turkey USD$ 14,393, Russia USD$ 16,736 and Lithuania 
USD$ 19,319. Our data comes from two government sources in Wuxi. The first is local Economic 
Statistics Bureau. The local Economic Statistics Bureau performs city level economic census 
annually to collect financial information of all firms in the city with annual turnover above 5 
million RMB (approximately 600,000 USD). It is part of national economic census which has 
started since 1999. FDI data comes from another government body, the Bureau of Foreign Trade 
and Collaboration, which has the responsibility to archive all FDI approval information. By 
combining the two sources, we have obtained the dataset used in our analysis. It is an unbalanced 
longitudinal data that records firm level information including their FDI decision for firms with a 
minimum annual turnover of 5 million RMB. 
 
One of the advantages of this dataset is that medium sized private firms are well presented. 
Although the cutoff point of the data of the former is 5 million RMB, it is still substantially lower 
than that used in commercial databases, from which only an iceberg of large Chinese firms’ 
information is accessible. Another weakness of commercial databases is that there is no consistent 
matching between Chinese (parent) firms and their outward FDI information. The city of Wuxi is 
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known for its dynamic private sector. It is located in an economic region in China with the most 
dynamic private sector (the Changjiang Delta). Therefore Wuxi data, although limited, does 
facilitate our focus on POEs for which finance factors are most acute. We define POEs as firms 
with 51% or above equity held by private owners in the firm. 
 
3.2. The model and measurement of variables   
Our hypotheses lead us to have the following specification: 
 
Pr(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 = 𝟏) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒔𝑖𝑡−1
∗ 𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒔𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑𝑖𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽4 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒔𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒔𝑖𝑡−1
∗ 𝑾𝒆𝒍𝒇𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10 ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
11
1
 +  𝛽11 ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
34
1
+ 𝛽12 ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
2007
1999
 
 
Where i is firm, j and t denote industry and year respectively. To control for simultaneity, we use 
lagged dependent variables except for year, industry dummies and industry-based controls. We 
measure FDI decision as a binomial variable with value “1” indicating FDI and “0” otherwise. 
Therefore, a logistic regression is employed to examine the impact of our dependent variables on 
the probability of firms’ FDI decision.  We adjust standard errors by clustering it on firm level in 
all regressions.  
   
Measuring firms’ access to external finance is a complex issue. The financing constraints 
literature has developed the Q theory of investment suggested by Tobin (1969), and the Euler 
equation for the capital stock (e.g. Love, 2003; Forbes, 2007). But these approaches cannot be 
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applied in our case because financial information needed for these estimates is limited. Current 
literature focusing on developing countries either uses questionnaire survey data (e.g. Beck, and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2004; Clarke, Cull and Peria, 2006; Xiao and North, 2012), or measures it by 
the ratio of firms’ long term credit to total assets (e.g. Claessens, Feijend, and Laeven, 2008; 
Gormley, 2010; Lin, 2011). Apart from our data availability that makes the latter proxy feasible 
for us to adopt, the proxy is also a suitable choice considering FDI is long-term investment, for 
which a firm’s long-term access to external finance should matter most. Our focus on POEs 
within a region means that macro institutional factors that often affect firms’ access to external 
finance in cross-country (or cross-region) context are not an issue in our measurement.  
 
To test the asymmetrical impact of access to finance on POEs with various attributes, we measure 
external finance dependence of an industry with four proxies. The first is the net value of current 
assets minus current liability scaled by total assets. Technology intensity is the ratio of R&D 
expenses to total expenditure. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets scaled by the number of 
employees. We made modification of the measurement of Manova (2013) by using the number of 
employees because we do not have data on book-value assets. Finally, inventory is measured by 
the ratio of inventories to total sales (Manova, Wei, and Zhang, 2011). We code the industries 
based on the mean values of the proxies: when the industry’s value is higher than the sample mean, 
we code it as “1”; otherwise “0”. An exception is for asset tangibility. We reverse it by coding 
industries with lower tangibility than average with the value of “1”; otherwise “0”. This is to ease 
the interpretation of our results. We expect the interactive variables of these industries proxies with 
access to finance to have a statistically significant and positive coefficient to support our 
hypothesis.  
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Group association is measured by two dummies. First, we measure all firms with group association 
with the value of “1”, “0” otherwise. Secondly, since each group network has its core firm, we 
code the core firm with the value of “1”; “0” otherwise. The intuition is that the beneficial effect 
of accessing scarce resource may be more pronounced for core firms than the rest of the network. 
This would indicate a hierarchy-based power structure (Keister, 1988). Alternatively, all firms 
within the group association may benefit from the network, and the access to finance depends on 
a network-based coordination that aims to maximize the prosperity of the group as a whole. 
Usually, if the firm is an affiliated member of a business group, there is “fushu” (i.e. affiliated) in 
its name. When such information is absent or ambiguous, we check the location and history of the 
firm to judge whether it is the core firm of a business group or it is an affiliate3. We expect the 
interactive terms of the two variables with access to finance to have statistically significant and 
negative coefficients if our hypothesis were to be supported.  
 
We measure firm’s welfare provision with the natural log of the sum of three types of insurance 
provided by the firm per employee. They are unemployment insurance, medical insurance and 
housing benefit. Firms in China are obliged to provide full-time but not part-time employees 
with these benefits, so this measure can indirectly reflect to what extent the firm relies on part-
time staff. Alternatively, even some firms choose to pay less welfare benefit to their full-time 
employees than they should in practice, welfare provision per person is a direct indicator of the 
generosity of employment conditions. The interactive term of welfare provision with firms’ 
access to finance is expected to be statistically significant and positive if our hypothesis were to 
be supported. 
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We control for several firm attributes.  First, we include fixed assets, measured by the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. On the one hand, higher level of fixed assets is a proxy for the amount 
of collateral (tangibility) that a firm can pledge, thereby influencing firm’s financial position; on 
the other, is also indicates the potential of economies of scale, which may motivate firms to 
expand abroad (e.g. Markusen and Venable, 1998). We consider firm size, measured by the 
natural log of employee number. Larger firms are more likely to invest abroad; but once the firm 
becomes a multinational enterprise, size has less influence on the firm’s further foreign 
expansion (e.g. Markusen, 1995). We include this variable since we focus on firms’ first time 
FDI decisions. Firm age is measured by the number of years since the firm’s operation started. 
Past research argues that older firms are more likely to become foreign direct investor 
(Blomstrom and Lipsey, 1991), but Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) find ambiguous impact of age on 
FDI. Firms need time to accumulate experience, resources, and develop competitiveness; yet, the 
rate of accumulation can be diminishing over time (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). Therefore, it 
could have a non-linear effect on the probability of FDI. To consider this, we also include its 
squared term in our regression.  We have R&D dummy, which is coded by “1” if the firm has 
expenses in R&D activities, “0” otherwise. This measurement considers the fact that 91% of 
firms in our sample having zero R&D expenses. One of the most stylized facts about 
multinational corporations is that they have high levels of R&D compared to their peers. R&D is 
often used as the indicator of firm-specific advantage that motivate firms’ internationalization 
decision (Calvet, 1981; Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1995).  
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We also include export in our regression. The relationship between FDI and export is uncertain 
a priori.  According to the horizontal FDI model (Markusen, 1984), they substitute each other to 
serve a foreign market, that is, export may reduce firms’ incentive to engage in FDI. But export 
may increase firms’ incentive to undertake FDI, which then helps them withdraw export, since 
most firms start with export rather than FDI. This is the central tenet of product life cycle theory 
(Vernon, 1966). The gradual expansion from export to FDI may make export a strong (positive) 
predictor of firms’ FDI decision. Second, some FDI projects are set up to enhance exports from 
home to the host country by facilitating distribution, sales and after-sales services (Krautheim, 
2013). In such cases, export may motivate firms to set up FDI abroad, which then enhances 
firms’ export to the market. Third, in the above two scenarios, an implicit assumption is that the 
destination of FDI and export market are the same country, hence the potential substitution 
between the two. But in reality, firms may choose to export to some countries, but undertake 
FDI in others. For example, in our sample, a Wuxi-based textile POE had been exporting to the 
Japanese and European markets for over ten years before it had its first FDI in Mongolia in 
1999.  The reason, according to the general manager, was that Mongolia has a more relaxed 
quota system4, which enables them to increase their export volume to their export markets (e.g. 
Japan and Europe). In such case, there is no substitute effect since the export markets and the 
location of FDI do not coincide5. To capture the precise relationship between export and FDI, 
information on the export market, the destination of FDI, and their timings is needed. 
Unfortunately, although we have data on firms’ export, we do not have information of the 
export market/s or the timing. Therefore, we simply add export status as a control. We code it 
with the value of “1” if the firm has export; “0” if the firm is not an exporter. This is to consider 
that only 16.8% of firms report positive value of export in our sample. We include state 
18/37 
 
ownership and foreign ownership as additional controls. This is to consider that some of POEs 
have minority state or/and foreign shareholding. To control for the influence of state and foreign 
equity, we code them as two dummy variables respectively.   
 
We include total factor productivity (TFP) in the estimation. TFP is an important determinant of 
a firm’s value added. It provides a broader gauge of firm level performance than some of the 
more conventional measures, such as labour productivity or firm profitability.  For example, 
profitability captures only the part of the value added; an inefficient firm can achieve high 
profitability merely because it has access to low cost labour, capital or materials6. It is 
advantageous to use TFP because it is estimated based on multiple input measures of firm 
performance. TFP is usually measured as the Solow residual, defined as the difference between 
the observed output and its fitted value calculated via OLS. However, this method suffers from 
two biases: simultaneity bias and selection bias. The first bias results from potential correlation 
between productivity and input choices. The second bias is a ‘survival’ bias meaning that low 
productive firms are absent in the sample because they shut down and exit the market. Therefore 
firms covered in the sample are not randomly selected, which is the ‘survival’ bias. There are 
two methods addressing these concerns. One is developed by Olley-Pakes (1996) and the other 
Levinsohn-Petrin method (2003). We opt for the latter because of data-driven benefit that it 
offers. To correctly estimate TFP using Olley-Pakes method, one needs to use investment as a 
proxy. However, it is not uncommon that a large proportion of firms in developing countries 
report zero investment (Petrin, Poi and Levinsohn, 2004). This is the case in our sample, in 
which 84% of firms have zero long-term investment and 97% of firms had zero short-term 
investment. Therefore, we opt to use Levinsohn-Petrin which relies on value added measured by 
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gross-output net of immediate inputs to estimate the production function. TFP is estimated in 
three stages with this method. First, we estimate the coefficient of labor and combined 
coefficient of material and capital by substituting a third-order polynomial approximation in 
capital and material. Second, we isolate the coefficient of capital and labor. Third, we insert the 
estimated coefficient of labor and capital to the data to estimate individual firm’s TFP.  
 
We have two industry variables. One is entry rate measured by the number of new entries by 
industry. This may indicate the dynamics and competition of the industry. The other is the sales 
volatility, measured by the ratio of sales to sales of previous year by industry. This can indicate 
the demand uncertainty of industries. We choose these control variables based on previous studies 
on FDI decision (Buch, Kesternich, Lipponer, and Schnitzer, 2009; Lee, 2010; Todo, 2011). Table 
1 provides detailed explanation of our key variables, their measurement, and descriptive statistics. 
The correlation matrix of key variables is presented in Table 2. We proceed to report our results 
in the next section.  
 
(INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE) 
(INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE) 
 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
We report our results in a step-wise manner first, and then provide a full regression that presents 
results of all hypotheses in Table 3. We run logistic regressions with industry and time fixed 
effects in all estimates. The standard errors are adjusted by clustering it on firm level. Both year 
and industry fixed effects are included in estimates. In Model 1, we find that access to finance 
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has a statistically significant and positive coefficient, supporting our first hypothesis. The 
coefficient is 0.151, indicating that for a one unit increase in access to finance, the expected 
increase in odds ratio of having FDI is approximately 16% (1-e^(0.151)). Moving to Model 2, 
we find that the interactive term of external finance dependence and access to finance is a 
statistically significant and positive estimator. But the magnitude is small: a one-unit increase in 
access to finance yields an increase in log odds of 0.346 (0.303+0.043) for higher external 
finance dependence industries compared to 0.303 for those lower ones.  This is equivalent to an 
increase of 41% (1-e^ (0.346)) in odds ratio for the former and 35% (1-e^ (0.303)) for the latter. 
We then use high technology as an alternative proxy for high external dependence in Model 3. 
The coefficient of the interactive term is now 0.349, and statistically significant. This means that 
for firms in high technology industries, a one unit change of access to finance yields a difference 
of 0.592(0.243+0.349) in log odds, which is about 81% increase in odds ratio. In comparison, for 
firms in low technology industries, the coefficient is 0.243, which is equivalent to only 28% 
increase in odds ratio.  Next, we interact (low) tangibility with access to finance as another proxy 
for high finance dependence in Model 4. Its coefficient is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that firms in lower tangibility industries rely on access to finance more than those in 
higher ones. For the former, a one-unit increase in access to finance means 0.580(0.184+0.396) 
increase in log odds, which is nearly 79% increase in odds ratio; for the latter, a one-unit increase 
only yields a 20% increase in odds ratio. The final interactive term is based on high inventory 
and access to finance in Model 5. Its coefficient is quite small: 0.085, albeit significant. This 
yields approximately 35% increase in odds ratio for high inventory sectors (1-e^ (0.303) and 
24% for low inventory sectors. Our industry-based analysis supports the second hypothesis that 
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innate industry differences affect firms’ probability of undertaking FDI, although the magnitude 
appears to be particularly large for industries with high technology intensity and low tangibility.  
 
Moving to Model 6, the group association reduces firms’ reliance on external finance by log adds 
of 0.079, or about 8% in odds ratio (1-e^ (-.0.79). Since access to finance receives a coefficient 
of 0.335, a one-unit increase of access to finance increases the odd ratio for associated firms by 
28%, but 39% for those without association, indicating that the reliance for non-associated firms 
is higher. Meanwhile, the interactive term of association core and access to finance has a 
coefficient of -0.125, which represents approximately 12% drop in odds ratio. Taking the 
coefficient of access to finance together, this means that a one unit increase of access to finance 
increases the odds of core firms of undertaking FDI by 22%, but for those not being the core 
firms, this odd ratio is 39%. We performed a separate Wald test, which shows that the difference 
between the two coefficients is statistically significant at 10% level (e.g. β3 ≠β4). This confirms 
that the dependence on external finance is weaker for all associated firms, but the magnitude in 
the drop is larger for core firms.   
 
(INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE) 
 
Finally, we report the results on all hypotheses in Model 7. The coefficient of access to finance is 
almost doubled than that on in Model 1. The coefficient is 0.335, equivalent to 1.40 in odds. This 
means that for a one-unit increase in access to finance, the odds increase from one to 1.40 (i.e. 
40% increase). We keep external finance dependence as the industry level interaction as a 
conservative way of testing our hypotheses since it attains a lowest coefficient among the four 
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industry-based proxies. The coefficient received (0.051) is close to that in Model 3 (0.043). The 
two group related interactive terms also receive qualitatively unchanged results in Model 7 
compared to those in Model 6.  The interactive term of welfare and access to finance receives a 
coefficient of 0.105, which is statistically significant at 10% level, lending support to our fourth 
hypothesis that more generous labour welfare provision increases firms’ reliance on external 
finance for their FDI decision. To sum up the results in Model 7, all our hypotheses are 
supported in our estimates.   
 
(INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE) 
 
In interpreting interactive terms, the coefficients of the interactive terms in logistic regressions 
like ours may mask the distribution of its real effects across the sample space, therefore could be 
misleading. This is because the marginal effect of a change in both interacted variables is not 
equal to the marginal effect of changing just the interaction term. This is compounded by the fact 
that the interaction effect is conditional on covariates in logistic (non-linear) regressions. 
Therefore, we adopt the method suggested by Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) to calculate the 
estimated cross-partial derivative to correctly estimate the interactive terms. We report the 
results in Table 4, which is derived from Model 7 in Table 3. Overall, none of the results 
contradicts our previous interpretations. For example, the mean interaction effect of access to 
finance and industry finance dependence is positive, with z-value of 7.28. The mean interaction 
effect of access to finance and group association is -9.47, and that for core firms is -14.06. Both 
group associated firms in general and core firms in specific rely less on external finance to 
support their FDI activities. Finally, the mean interaction effect of access to finance and welfare 
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provision attains a z-value of 11.58, confirming our hypothesis that generous provision of 
welfare increases firm’s vulnerability to external finance.  
 
We assess our results with two robustness checks. First, we use an alternative measure of access 
to finance: the sum of long-term and short-term credit scaled by total assets. Some past studies 
have used this proxy to indicate firms’ access to external finance (e.g. Claessens, Feijen, and 
Laeven, 2008; Du and Girma, 2007; Huang, et al., 2011). The regression results using this as the 
indicator generated qualitatively unchanged results as those reported above. We then used the 
method suggested by Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) to check the distribution of the interaction 
effects across the entire sample space. The results are remarkably consistent. All interactive 
effects are shown to have either a positive (H2, and H4) or negative (H3) distribution, 
confirming the results obtained in Model 7 of Table 3.  Second, since our dependent variable is 
quite skewed: only 1.21% of the sample has FDI in the observed period of time. The rareness of 
our interested variable may generate bias in logistic regressions because the probability density 
distribution of “1s” tends to be overshadowed by very large number of “0s”. We use weighting 
as a strategy to correct the estimation bias. Following the method recommended by Tomz, King 
and Zeng (1999), we estimate the models by specifying the weights of “1s” (where FDI occurs) 
as 0.05% and 1.3% respectively since this is the range of FDI in our sample. The rationale of this 
method is to correct the bias of short tail associated with the probability of the rarer event (King 
and Zeng, 2001a: 704). Therefore, this method maximizes the weighted log-likelihood instead of 
the log-likelihood in normal logistic regressions. It is particularly suitable when a large sample 
(i.e. exceeding twenty thousand) is available for estimates (King and Zeng, 2001b). We have 
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obtained qualitatively similar results when we use either indicator to proxy access to credits. We 
do not report the robustness results for the sake of brevity. But they are available upon request. 
 
 
5 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have analysed whether or not access to bank credit plays a role in firms’ FDI decision. We 
find confirmatory results that the importance of external finance is significant for Chinese POEs 
to expand overseas in the form of Greenfield FDI. The importance is heightened if the POE 
operates in financially dependent industry; if it has no group association; or if it adopts generous 
welfare provisions for its employees. Our findings provide new evidence that access to external 
finance, as a factor overlooked in traditional FDI theories, is an important antecedent of firms’ 
FDI decision.  
 
Traditional MNCs from developed countries are usually more capital intensive than domestic 
firms (e.g. Chen, 2011). More developed financial markets have facilitated these MNCs’ global 
expansion. It is without doubt that the more aggressive internationalization of state-owned-
enterprises in China is in part driven by their easy access to state finance. Therefore, it is 
imperative for the Chinese government to continue to reform the credit market and create a level 
play field for POEs to access necessary finance to support their FDI projects, which will further 
promote China’s integration into the global market. POEs can also become, given adequate 
finance to expand, important strategic partners of state-owned-enterprises investing in overseas 
market. Considering that group association significantly alleviates POEs’ vulnerability to credit 
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market, POEs may consider promoting association with not only domestically-owned but also 
foreign-invested-firms in China, which usually have easy access to finance from their 
headquarters or other international sources. Alliances with foreign firms can also facilitate POEs’ 
collaborations with foreign-invested-firms in overseas market in which they have had 
establishments.  
 
Our research also finds that providing generous employee welfare benefits will make POEs more 
vulnerable to credit market. We do not suggest firms should finance their overseas ambitions at 
the expense of their employees. Human resource is critical intangible asset for firms’ long-term 
growth. Although employee welfare may be seemingly in conflict with firms’ need to invest as 
both require capital allocation, POEs in China may be better off by seeking more fundamental 
ways to improve their access to external finance, such as by improving their accounting 
standards, corporate governance, and transparency. These measures may improve their access to 
external finance without trading off the welfare of the firm with the employees. The 
effectiveness of the market-oriented mechanism in allocating finance will ultimately depend on 
to what extent the state will limit their interference in the credit market and allow the invisible 
hand to coordinate and discipline the capital allocation. This goes back to the point that we make 
earlier: it is critical for the Chinese government to continue to reform the credit market. From 
firms’ point of view, their first FDI decision may carry significant implications on their long-
term growth because once their FDI projects start operation in the foreign market, they will be 
gradually able to access external finance directly in the foreign credit or equity market, thereby 
reducing their reliance on home country finance. This, however, does not substitute the need for 
deeper financial market reforms in China.  
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Endnotes 
1. Based on the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) of the investment climate, conducted in 80 
countries over 1999–2000, 80% of private firms in China cite financing constraints as a major obstacle. 
This figure, which is twice the median figure over the whole sample (38.5%), ranks China as the most 
financially constrained country in the sample, beating Haiti (74.4%) and the Kyrgyz Republic (66.7%) 
The figure computed by Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) excludes firms with state or foreign ownership 
since they probably enjoy preferential access to finance.  
 
2. Although the “Go-Global” campaign was initiated in 1999 in China by the central government to 
promote Chinese business abroad, Chinese firms started to undertake FDI as early as the 1980s. The Wuxi 
local statistics bureau explained that most early FDI undertakes were state-owned-enterprises, which went 
abroad to promote local traditional industries (such as textile) as well as infrastructure related projects. 
Local statistics bureau also shared with us the FDI data in 1980s and early 1990s. But we are unable to 
include them in our analysis because there is a lack of firm level information. Nation-wide data collection 
of firm level information in China only started in 1999.   
 
3. We triangulate our data in two ways. First, we hired two PhD students, both native Chinese, to search 
and code the data independently. Second, we sought help from Global Business, GTA Information 
Technology (GTA), a commercial data company based on Hong Kong to verify and amend our data. 
 
4. The interviewed company was specialized in producing men’s shirts for the Japanese and Western 
European market. Its move to Mongolia was driven in part by the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), which 
was eventually dismantled in 2005. We conducted twelve interviews with ten firms that had FDI abroad 
in 2011 during the data collection process in Wuxi, China.  
 
5. The relationship between export and FDI can be more complex if the assumption of single product is 
relaxed. When the multiple products refer to intermediate and final products, firms may export the former 
and undertake FDI for the latter (for assembly, testing, customer service, etc) to serve a foreign market. 
For example, Japanese automobile firms had to export intermediate components to the US market to 
support their assembly line in the US in their early years of (FDI) operation in the US. Alternatively, if 
the multi-products are genuinely different products supplied by, for example, a conglomerate, the decision 
of whether to export or to undertake FDI depends on the difference of factor endowments between the 
home and host country, transportation costs, trade barriers, to what extent the product requires close-to 
market support, and the size of the market, etc. For example, Tata is one of the largest exporters for 
various metal materials, footwear, garments and leather products in India, but it undertakes foreign direct 
investment in other sectors, such as supermarket, automobiles, and defence around the world. To more 
accurately capture the relationship between export and FDI, the analytical unit needs to be narrowed 
down to the firm-product-market level. The paucity of data has made it difficult to trace the precise 
relationship. Prior country level studies usually point to a positive relationship between and two, 
indicating that complementary usually outweighs substitution.  
 
6. See Lieberman and Kang (2008) for a case study of a Korean steelmaker for the differences between 
TFP and profitability in measuring firm performance.    
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Table 1: Measurement of key variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Measurement  Mean  Std. Dev Min Max 
FDI decision =1 if the firm has FDI; 0=otherwise 0.006 0.047 0.000 1.000 
Access to finance Long term bank credit/total assets 0.102 0.765 0.000 43.245 
Fixed assets Fixed assets/total assets 0.235 0.167 0.000 0.875 
Firm size Natural log of employees 4.232 1.021 0.654 9.022 
Age  Number of years in operation 9.054 7.543 0.000 106.000 
R&D =1 if the firm has R&D expenditure; 0=otherwise 0.082 0.275 0.000 1.000 
Total factor productivity (TFP) It is measured using Levinsohn-Petrin method based on value added. Number of 
employee is used as freely variable input, material costs are the proxy. Capital is 
specified by the log value of total assets 
2.451 0.703 -4.562 5.884 
Export =1 if the firm has export; 0=otherwise 0.113 0.194 0.000 1.000 
State equity =1 if the firm has state equity; 0=otherwise 0.132 0.185 0.000 1.000 
Foreign equity =1 if the firm has foreign equity; 0=otherwise 0.219 0.255 0.000 1.000 
Entry (industry) Number of new entries by two-digit industry classification 33.709 43.743 0.000 149.000 
Volatility (industry) Annual total sales fluctuations by two-digit industry classification 15.574 1.177 6.537 17.217 
External finance dependency (industry) =1 if (current assets-current liability)/total assets>sample mean; 0=otherwise 0.637 0.196 0.000 1.000 
Technology intensity (industry) =1 if R&D expense/total operation costs>sample mean; 0=otherwise 0.027 0.026 0.000 0.090 
Inventory ratio (industry) =1 if value of inventory/total sales>sample mean; 0=otherwise 0.167 0.027 0.070 0.230 
Asset tangibility (industry) =1 if fixed assets/employee number<sample mean; 0=otherwise 0.307 0.111 0.120 0.620 
Group association  =1 if the firm is associated with a group network; 0=otherwise 0.118 0.264 0.000 1.000 
Group association core =1 if the firm is the core firm of a group network; 0=otherwise 0.048 0.064 0.000 1.000 
Welfare provision The natural log of the sum of medical insurance, unemployment insurance and 
housing benefit per person 
7.616 0.783 0.151 12.275 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of key variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) FDI                   
(2) Access to finance 0.0871*                  
(3) Fixed assets 0.0091 0.0489*                 
(4) Firm size 0.0591* 0.2802* 0.1606*                
(5) Age -0.0029 0.0937* -0.0738* 0.2114*               
(6) R&D  0.0193* 0.0719* -0.0202* 0.1279* 0.0963*              
(7) Export 0.1432* 0.4231* 0.2353 0.3212 0.0453 0.0367             
(8) State equity -0.1221 0.4831* 0.3210* 0.3335* 0.1546 0.1003 0.1092            
(9) Foreign equity  -0.0313 0.3421* 0.2775* 0.3156* -0.1264 0.3287* 0.3421 -0.016           
(10) TFP 0.0204* 0.1325* -0.0643* 0.1631* -0.0110 0.0410* 0.2175 -0.2186* 0.3224*          
(11) Entry -0.0166* -0.0145 -0.0081 -0.0142 -0.0228* -0.0373* -0.0486* -0.0677* -0.0346 -0.1451         
(12) Volatility -0.0222* 0.0332* -0.0915* -0.0093 -0.0591* 0.0114 0.0861* 0.4195* 0.0324 -0.0475 -0.0653        
(13) External finance 
dependency 
-0.0344 0.0315 0.0376 0.0231 0.0435 -0.0865 0.0364 -0.0453 0.2543 -0.0463 -0.0874 0.0112       
(14) Technology intensity  0.0016 0.3203 0.0432 0.1632 -0.1654 0.3423* 0.3886* -0.1943 0.2113 0.3122* -0.0734 -0.0544 0.4076*      
(15) Inventory ratio  -0.1342 0.0054 0.0775 0.0653 -0.0754 -0.1449 -0.0761 -0.0754 -0.0475 -0.1721 -0.0766 -0.1002 0.1864* -0.0432     
(16) Asset tangibility  -0.0246 0.2764 -0.3532 0.0683 0.1175* -0.0045 0.2841 -0.0340 -0.0543 0.0064 0.0487 0.0754 -0.2873* -0.1154 0.0485    
(17) Group association core 0.1671 0.1754* 0.2651* 0.2364* 0.2945 -0.0654 0.2147 -0.0328 -0.2172 0.0784 0.0629 0.1787 -0.0654 0.0054 0.0509 0.1082   
(18) Group association  0.1034 0.0784* 0.0072 0.0765 0.1143 -0.0376 0.0877 -0.0320 -0.2101 0.0879 0.1143 0.0864 -0.0878 0.0042 0.1002 0.0832 0.0453  
(19) Welfare provision -0.0043 -0.1309 -0.0368 0.0674 0.0065* 0.1420 0.1453 -0.0322 0.2276* 0.0874* -0.0765 -0.0115 0.1184 0.1768 -0.0765 -0.0878 0.0867* 0.0564 
Notes: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailored).     
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Table 3: Logistic regressions on access to finance and the decision of FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  High 
external 
finance 
dependence 
High 
technology 
intensity 
Low  
asset 
tangibility  
High 
inventory 
ratio 
High 
external 
finance 
dependence 
High 
external 
finance 
dependence 
Access to financet-1  0.151** 0.303** 0.243** 0.184** 0.218** 0.327*** 0.335*** 
 (0.058) (0.127) (0.095) (0.076) (0.081) (0.074) (0.079) 
Access to financet-1* Industry finance dependence  0.043** 
(0.017) 
0.349*** 
(0.102) 
0.396** 
(0.145) 
0.085*** 
(0.023) 
0.056** 
(0.021) 
0.051** 
(0.022) 
Industry finance dependence  -0.127 0.103 -0.003 -0.036 -0.132 -0.128 
  (0.110) (0.118) (0.039) (0.037) (0.115) (0.116) 
Access to financet-1* Group Association       -0.079** 
(0.039) 
-0.077** 
(0.037) 
Group association      -0.213 -0.235 
      (0.181) (0.192) 
Access to financet-1* Group Association core      -0.125*** 
(0.031) 
-0.129*** 
(0.030) 
Group association core      -0.067 -0.066 
      (0.101) (0.101) 
Access to financet-1* Welfare provision       0.105** 
(0.045) 
Welfare       -0.445 
       (0.277) 
Exportt-1 0.054* 0.060* 0.061* 0.062** 0.059** 0.063** 0.066** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.29) (0.026) (0.028) 
State equityt-1 -0.123 -0.117 -0.115 -0.113 -0.115 -0.117 -0.117 
 (0.887) (0.854) (0.876) (0.877) (0.890) (0.843) (0.811) 
Foreign equityt-1 -0.046 -0.051 -0.052 -0.056 -0.055 -0.055 -0.056 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.077) 
TFPt-1 0.807** 0.891** 0.892** 0.867** 0.811*** 0.893*** 0.878*** 
 (0.296) (0.343) (0.399) (0.381) (0.258) (0.301) (0.289) 
Fixed Assetst-1 -0.104 1.356 2.944 1.234 1.448 2.345* 1.345 
 (1.174) (2.132) (2.466) (1.248) (1.238) (1.012) (3.205) 
Firm sizet-1 0.693*** 0.120* 0.588 0.667** 0.559* 0.432 0.725* 
 (0.197) (0.497) (0.349) (0.232) (0.235) (0.538) (0.312) 
Aget-1 0.078* 0.061 0.123 0.110* 0.061 0.074 0.133 
 (0.033) (0.051) (0.111) (0.043) (0.036) (0.048) (0.076) 
Aget-1 squared -0.115 -0.113 -0.116 -0.117 -0.117 -0.113 -0.115 
 (0.0880 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.084) (0.089) 
R&Dt-1 1.342** 1.448* 1.288* 0.913 1.145* 1.121* 1.245** 
 (0.464) (0.622) (0.642) (0.644) (0.522) (0.523) (0.456) 
Entrytj 0.002 -0.05 0.029* 0.009 -0.001 -0.031 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.038) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.232) (0.015) 
Volatilitytj 0.503 7.223 -0.881 -0.168 1.282 -3.323 0.785 
 (0.730) (6.421) (0.676) (1.112) (1.274) (3.238) (1.134) 
Constant -10.617 -78.233 -4.562 -6.102 -4.430 -6.231 -7.786 
 (8.813) (62.320) (9.453) (17.698) (12.276) (46.234) (13.100) 
Pseudo R2 31% 41% 44% 43% 41% 51% 56% 
N 27162 27043 27040 27016 27040 27040 27008 
Notes: the dependent variable FDI is a dummy variable which is coded as “1” if the firm has an FDI and “0” otherwise.  The coefficients are based on log 
odds. All estimates include year and industry fixed effects. The year dates from 1999 to 2007. Industry classification follows two digit industry codes. There 
are 34 industries included. VIF values are below 5.31 in all estimates. All independent variables are one year lagged.  Standard errors are clustered on firm.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4: z-statistic of Interaction Effects after Logit 
 
Interaction term variables Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Access to finance * Industry finance dependence _logit_ie 
_logit_se 
_log_z 
0.11794 
0.01619 
7.28251 
 
0.00213 
0.00067 
1.05354 
0.00031 
0.00024 
0.55432 
0.22285 
0.02731 
13.23423 
Access to finance * Group association _logit_ie 
_logit_se 
_log_z 
-0.08843 
0.00933 
-9.47164 
 
 
0.00543 
0.00059 
1.43213 
-0.17105 
0.00065 
-27.09988 
-0.00057 
0.02191 
-3.76578 
Access to finance * Group association core _logit_ie 
_logit_se 
_log_z 
-0.08942 
0.00667 
-14.05978 
0.00569 
0.00055 
1.33441 
-0.19551 
0.00058 
-29.00932 
-0.00055 
0.01665 
-3.43445 
Access to finance * Welfare provision _logit_ie 
_logit_se 
_log_z 
0.14112 
0.01225 
11.58316 
0.00235 
0.00041 
2.34227 
0.00084 
0.00076 
4.55644 
 
0.23477 
0.02671 
27.23112 
Notes: the calculation is based on Model 7 in Table 3. Observations are 27008.  
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Appendix 1: Industry distribution of POEs in Wuxi 1999-2007 
Two-digit  industry name Percent (%) Cumulative Percent (%) Number Cumulative number 
Agricultural and side-line foods processing  1.91 1.91 519 519 
Beverage production 1.09 3.01 296 818 
Chemical fibres 1.64 4.64 445 1260 
Clothes, shoes and hat manufacture 0.82 5.46 223 1483 
Common equipment 8.47 13.93 2301 3784 
Communications equipment, computer and other electronic equipment 4.65 14.75 1263 4006 
Craftwork and other manufactures 2.46 21.04 668 5715 
Cultural education and sports articles 2.46 23.5 668 6383 
Electric machines and apparatuses manufacturing 7.1 30.6 1929 8312 
Electricity and heating production and supply 1.09 31.69 296 8608 
Food production 3.83 35.52 1040 9648 
Fuel gas production and supply 0.27 35.79 73 9721 
Furniture manufacturing 0.55 36.34 149 9871 
Instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery manufacture  4.37 40.71 1187 11058 
Leather fur feather and other products 1.37 42.08 372 11430 
Metal products 5.25 47.33 1426 12856 
Mining: other mining industries 0.21 47.75 57 12913 
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing 0.27 47.81 73 12986 
Non-metal mineral products 7.38 55.19 2005 14991 
Papermaking and paper products 1.09 56.28 296 15287 
Petroleum processing, coking and nuclear fuel processing 0.55 56.83 149 15436 
Plastic products 2.46 59.29 668 16104 
Printing and record medium reproduction 1.37 60.66 372 16476 
Raw chemical material and chemical products 9.56 70.22 2597 19073 
Rubber products 2.19 72.4 595 19665 
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 0.82 73.22 223 19888 
Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals 3.28 76.5 891 20779 
Special equipment 9.84 86.34 2673 23452 
Spinning industry 5.46 91.8 1483 24935 
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fibre and straw products 1.8 93.6 489 25424 
Tobacco products processing  0.11 93.76 30 25454 
Traffic equipment 5.74 99.45 1559 27013 
Waste resources and old material recycling and processing 0.27 99.73 73 27089 
Water production and supply 0.27 100 73 27162 
 
 
